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Abstract
We examine the stock market’s reaction to merger announcements in the lodging industry 
over the 1982-2000 period. Unlike the results for the overall market, we find that both the 
stockholders of the acquiring and target firms gain at the time of the merger announcement. In 
the lodging industry, mergers are positive net present value investments for bidders. Whereas 
for the overall market, merger bids are at the best zero net present value investments. In 
addition, we found that shareholders benefit from mergers in the short- (one year), medium 
(three year) and long-term (five-year). Lastly, the wealth gains to tender offers and significantly 
greater than the wealth gains to mergers for both the portfolio of target and acquiring firms.
Managers sell mergers to shareholders and institutional investors claiming that the value of 
the two firms is greater together than apart. In theory, this is probably true because of 
monopolistic power, efficiency gains, and/or the elimination of inefficiencies. But in reality, 
there are frictions and implementation problems such as clashes of corporate cultures, 
leadership problems and as a result, the financial reality may be quite different from the 
theoretical expectations of management. On average, over time, across all industries, fewer 
than half of all mergers have created value. In fact, according to The Economist (January 9th 
1999, pp 21-23), “study after study of past merger waves has shown that two of every three 
deals have not worked; the only winners are the shareholders of the acquired firm, who sell their 
company for more than it is really worth.” How, the prudent manager should wonder, can we 
be one of the few that succeed? The main purpose of this paper is to analyze whether mergers 
in the lodging industry have added value. Specifically, we examine both the targets’ and 
acquirers’ stock price reaction to merger announcements. In addition, we compare the pre­
merger value of the two firms to the short-, medium-, and long-term post-merger combined 
values.
The hospitality industry is a mature industry, where the leader companies have been fighting 
for market share. Segmentation had been one of the strategies to maintain growth in this 
environment. However once the demand for new products leveled off, consolidation became 
the way to grow. So, given the slow pace of internal growth that can be achieved through 
regular business development processes, consolidation was a key tool to meet the market’s 
expectations of fast and constant growth.
Both big and small companies have been involved. For the bigger corporations the main 
reason was "getting bigger", in pursuit of critical mass. Smaller companies had a different 
approach; they combined in an effort to remain competitive, sharing resources and trying to 
achieve economies of scale.1 Also, the globalization of the market has made U.S. companies 
acquire brands and corporations overseas in an effort to ensure an international presence. 
Buying international companies is a faster and more efficient way of expanding than purchasing 
properties individually.
1 Economies of scale refer to decreases in per-unit costs that result from an increase in the size or scale of a 
company’s operations.
Mergers and acquisitions proliferate in all sectors in times of steady growth, low inflation 
and a hot stock market. Furthermore, economics, technology and logistics are making size in 
the lodging industry increasingly more important. The more rooms you have, the lower the cost 
per room of supplies including furniture, bedding and the expensive technologies demanded by 
guests who want to be able to plug in their computers in their rooms. Training also becomes 
more efficient when spread across a large workforce.
The computers and communications systems used for reservations and billing also become 
more useful as companies grow. With a computer reservation system, hotel companies can 
track their customers’ spending over time in different hotels. Frequent guests are worth the 
investment, by setting up a room the way they like it and/or by offering discounts. Such 
systems are expensive but the relative cost decreases as the number of reservations increases.
Even though managers claim that the two firms are worth more together than apart, 
historically for the overall market, the financial reality has been somewhat disappointing. The 
shareholders whose company is bought end up richer; the shareholders of the buyer seldom do. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the financial reality of mergers in the lodging industry. 
That is, to estimate the effect of the announcement of corporate acquisitions on stockholder 
returns for a portfolio of acquirers and a portfolio of targets. Furthermore, we compare the 
value of the combined firms at one, three and five year intervals after the merger announcement 
to the sum of the values of each firm prior to the merger announcement. This allows us to 
determine whether the stock markets’ reaction at the time of the merger announcement is 
consistent with the additional value created over various time intervals following the merger.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the underlying 
theories of mergers. Section II describes the hypotheses tested in this article and Section III, the 
data sample. Section IV presents the methodology and reports the results of our statistical tests. 
The final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
I. Reasons for Takeovers
Takeovers occur through merger, tender offer, or proxy contest, and sometimes elements of 
all three are involved. In mergers or tender offers the bidding firm offers to buy the common 
stock of the target at a price in excess of the target’s previous market value. Mergers are 
negotiated directly with target managers and approved by the target’s board of directors before
going to a vote of target shareholders for approval. Tender offers are offers to buy shares made 
directly to target shareholders who decide individually whether to tender their shares for sale to 
the bidding firm. Proxy contests occur when an insurgent group, often led by a dissatisfied 
former manager or large stockholder, attempts to gain controlling seats on the board of 
directors.
Economic analysis identifies two broad motives for value maximizing mergers. Either they 
are undertaken to achieve synergies between the acquiring and the target firms, or they are 
undertaken to discipline the target firm’s managers. In synergistic takeovers, gains are 
generated by efficiencies that result from combining the physical operations of the acquiring 
and the target firm. In disciplinary takeovers, gains can be achieved without combining the 
physical operations of the two firms. Rather, altering the non-value maximizing operating 
strategies of the target firm’s managers generates gains.2 In either case, if mergers are value- 
maximizing decisions, the value of the combined firm should be at least the sum of the values of 
each firm separately.
Firms merge to fulfill certain objectives. The overriding goal for merging is the 
maximization of the owners’ wealth as reflected in the acquirer’s share price. More specific 
motives include growth or diversification, synergy, fund raising, increased managerial skill or 
technology, tax considerations, increased ownership liquidity, and defense against takeover. 
These motives should be pursued when they are believed to be consistent with owner wealth 
maximization. Each of these motives is described below.
1. Growth or diversification
Companies that desire rapid growth in size or market share or diversification in the range of 
their properties may find that a merger can be used to fulfill this objective. Instead of going 
through the time-consuming process of internal growth or diversification, the firm may achieve 
the same objective in a short period of time by merging with an existing firm. Such a strategy is 
often less costly than the alternative of building new product. If a firm that wants to expand can
2 Nonvalue maximizing behavior on the part of the target’s managers can take a variety of forms. For example, it 
could include the excessive consumption of corporate perquisites, excessive compensation, overpayment for 
supplies and raw materials, or the deployment of corporate resources to self-enriching or self-aggrandizing projects. 
It could also be that the target’s managers are simply ineffective at or incapable of operating the target firm 
efficiently.
find a suitable going concern, it may avoid many of the risks associated with the development of 
new properties. Moreover, when a firm expands or extends its product by acquiring another 
firm, it also removes a potential competitor.
2. Synergy
The synergy of mergers is the economies of scale resulting from the merged firms’ lower 
overhead. These economies of scale from lowering the combined overhead increase earnings to 
a level greater than the sum of the earnings of each of the independent firms. Synergy is most 
obvious when firms merge with other firms in the same line of business, because many 
redundant functions and employees can thereby be eliminated. Staff functions, such as 
purchasing and sales, are greatly affected by this type of combination as well as computers and 
reservation systems.
3. Financing
Often, firms combine to enhance their financing ability. A firm may be unable to obtain 
funds for its own internal expansion but able to obtain funds for external business combinations. 
Quite often, one firm may combine with another that has high liquid assets and low levels of 
liabilities. The acquisition of this type of cash-rich company immediately increases the firm’s 
borrowing power by decreasing its financial leverage. This should allow funds to be raised 
externally at a lower cost.
4. Taxes
Quite often, tax considerations are a key motive for merging. In such a case, the tax benefit 
generally stems from the feet that one of the firms has a tax loss carry forward. This means that 
the company’s tax loss can be applied against a limited amount of future income of the merged 
firm over the shorter of either 15 years or until the total tax loss has been fully recovered. Two 
situations could actually exist. A firm with a tax loss could acquire a profitable company to 
utilize the tax loss. In this case, the acquiring firm would boost the combination’s after-tax 
earnings by reducing the taxable income of the acquired firm. A tax loss may also be useful 
when a profitable firm acquires a firm that has such a loss. In either situation, however, the 
merger must be justified not only on the basis of the tax benefits but also on the grounds
consistent with the goal of owner wealth maximization. Moreover, the tax benefits described 
can be used only in mergers.
5. Liquidity
The merger of two small firms or a small and a larger firm may provide the owners of the 
small firm(s) with greater liquidity. This is due to the higher marketability associated with the 
shares of larger firms. Instead of holding shares in a small firm that has a very “thin” market, 
the owners will receive shares that are traded in a broader market and can thus be liquidated 
more readily. Also, owning shares for which market price quotations are readily available 
provides owners with a better sense of the value of their holdings. Especially in the case of 
small, closely held firms, the improved liquidity of ownership obtainable through merger with 
an acceptable firm may have considerable appeal.
II. Hypotheses
One of our concerns, in this paper, is to estimate the effect of corporate acquisitions on 
stockholder returns. In this section we examine a number of alternative hypotheses of mergers 
to derive testable implications for the effects of mergers on stockholder returns. These 
hypotheses fall within two categories, the positive impact hypotheses and the zero impact 
hypothesis.
1. The positive impact hypotheses
There are at least three hypotheses that predict that corporate acquisitions will have a 
positive impact on the values of target and/or bidding firm’s equity.3 Each of these hypotheses 
implies that the announcement of a corporate acquisition releases positive information about the 
firms involved and that the stock prices of these firms will rise to reflect this new information.
The first hypothesis is that mergers result in monopolistic market power and that monopoly 
rents are generated.4 The empirical implication is that the target and/or bidding firm 
stockholders benefit from a merger, but the hypothesis provides no prediction as to how the 
monopoly rents are split. Unsuccessful merger attempts generate no monopoly rents and no 
gains are implied for either firm. Furthermore, these unsuccessful mergers are not costless since 
the management of both the bidding and target firms dissipate resources in the offer. Abnormal 
losses in unsuccessful offers are therefore consistent with this hypothesis.
An alternative hypothesis is that there are gains from mergers arising from increased 
productive efficiency when the real assets of the two firms are combined. This synergy 
hypothesis suggests that combining these assets will result in an increased aggregate market 
value of the two firms.5 Vertical integration motivations are special cases of this hypothesis. The 
synergy hypothesis has the same empirical implications for stockholders as the monopolistic 
hypothesis: successful mergers will result in gains and unsuccessful offers will result in either a 
zero or negative impact. Thus, it is not possible to discriminate between the monopolistic and
3 Galai and Masulis (1976) demonstrate that corporate acquisitions will also affect the value of the firm’s debt.
4 See Ellert (1976) for a discussion and empirical test of this hypothesis.
5 Mandelker (1974) discusses this hypothesis.
synergy hypotheses by examining the impact of the takeover announcement on stockholder 
returns.
The internal efficiency hypothesis contends that the assets of the target firm were not being 
utilized efficiently prior to the takeover attempt. The bidding firm is assumed to be motivated 
by information on the inefficiency. A special case of this hypothesis is that corporate takeovers 
are a means of disciplining inept management.6 Whatever the origins of the inefficiency, the 
announcement of a takeover attempt are viewed as positive information for the target firm. The 
information released is that stockholder wealth will increase if the inefficiency is eliminated. 
Unless there are permanent barriers to the realization of these gains (in which case it is not an 
inefficiency) the market value of the target firms will increase.
The implication of the internal efficiency hypothesis for the market value of bidding firms is 
less clear. The impact of the takeover attempt depends upon the market's evaluation of the new 
information and the offering price, and either normal or positive abnormal returns are consistent 
with the hypothesis. If information of the target firm's inefficiency were publicly available prior 
to the offer, competition in the acquisition market would imply normal returns for the bidding 
firms. If the information is not publicly available prior to the offer and is not released during the 
offer, the bidding firms will realize positive abnormal returns. Thus, positive abnormal returns 
can be generated by bidders engaged in takeovers, which are successful. Those bidders whose 
tenders are unsuccessful, however, will not realize any gains and can experience abnormal 
losses as resources are dissipated.
2. The zero impact hypothesis
This hypothesis states that corporate takeovers have no impact on the values of the firms 
involved. The hypothesis implies that there are no net gains from altering the operations of the 
target or bidding firms. The empirical implications are that for the successful mergers the 
stockholders of both bidder and target firms earn normal returns. Unsuccessful offers are not 
costless and the stockholders of both firms can earn negative abnormal returns.
We have now developed two distinct sets of empirical implications of the effects of mergers 
on stockholder returns. These are summarized below. The monopolistic, synergy and internal 
efficiency hypotheses each predict non- negative abnormal performance for stockholders of
6 See Manne (1965) for an exposition of this argument.
firms engaged in successful mergers. The predictions of the zero impact hypothesis are 
obvious.
III. The Sample
Our data sample was formed by a two-stage process. First, we searched the CRSP data files 
for all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms delisted during 1981-1998. Second, we searched the 
SDC database for all mergers over the January 1999 -  March 2000 period. CRSP identifies 
firms delisted by reason of acquisition with a delisting code between 200 and 203 and a last 
dividend payment code starting with 32, 37, or 38. The delisting date is the effective date of 
acquisition. We checked the Capital Adjustments Register to identify the acquiring firm for 
each delisted firm. The announcement dates were collected from the Wall Street Journal Index. 
The final sample comprises acquisitions that satisfy the following criteria: the acquirer and the 
target are U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange (ASE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System (NASDAQ); and, the acquirer or the target is in the lodging industry.7
Table 1 reports the annual number and annual market value of target stocks for acquisitions 
completed during 1982-2000. Our sample includes a total of 57 acquisitions with an aggregate 
market value of target stocks of over $ 53 billion dollars. A noticeable trend is present in the 
data. During the late 1990’s, lodging companies had been joining together as never before. The 
value of lodging mergers of publicly traded companies has increased dramatically since 1993.
In 1993, there were 2 mergers valued at $29.7 million, in 1994, 5 mergers valued at $280 
million, in 1995, five mergers valued at $196 million, in 1996, four mergers valued at $ 4.9 
billion, in 1997, 7 mergers valued at $15 billion, and in 1998,11 mergers valued at $25 billion. 
In 1999 there were four mergers announced, valued at $4 billion. The value of acquisitions in 
the lodging industry was almost 1000 times greater in 1998 relative to 1993. Since 1998, the 
number and value of acquisitions has still been significant but far lower than the levels in 1997 
and 1998.
7 The lodging industry was defined by the 4 digit SIC code of 7011 and the Lodging Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
SIC codes o f6798 and 6799.
Table 1: Number and Value of Acquisitions by Calendar Year
Year Total Number of Acquisitions
Aggregate Dollar Value of 
All Acquisitions
1982 1 152.4
1983 2 423.7
1984 2 316.0
1985 3 460.3
1986 2 1,065.0
1988 4 50.7
1989 1 55.5
1990 1 48.4
1992 1 4.8
1993 2 29.7
1994 5 280.1
1995 5 196.4
1996 4 4,936.0
1997 7 15,559.6
1998 11 25,013.1
1999 5 4,827.0
2000 1 428.3
Total 57 53,847.0
A lot of the consolidation in 1998 was driven by REITS. Refer to Appendix A for a list of 
the publicly traded U.S. lodging companies involved in mergers over the 1982-2000 period. For 
example, Starwood and Patriot American were able to use their low-cost capital and unique 
structure to snatch up several billion dollars in acquisitions that included large hotel C-corps, 
small hotel portfolios and countless single hotel assets. The largest transaction during 1998 was 
between Starwood and ITT. After a very interesting battle Starwood acquired ITT, becoming 
the world’s largest lodging and gaming company with over 650 hotels. Also Patriot American 
went on an aggressive acquisition spree that included Wyndam Hotel Corporation, WGH 
Resorts and Casinos, Grand Heritage Hotels, Interstate Hotels, and many others. The first hotel 
"paper clip" REIT was created when Capstar Hotel and American General Hospitality agreed to 
merge. CapStar spun off its hotel operations and management business to its stockholders as 
MeriStar Hotels and Resorts (the new C-Corp that was created) and subsequently merged its 
hotel assets into American General Hospitality (which was renamed as MeriStar Hospitality 
Corporation). MeriStar became the third-largest hotel REIT and MeriStar Hotels and Resorts 
became the country’s second largest independent hotel manager. The combined REIT owned 
110 hotels, focusing mainly in the premium end of the fiill-service sector
Significant consolidation had also Occurred in C-Corps. For example, Doubletree had been 
very active. Since going public in 1994, Doubletree merged with Guest Quarters. Then, in 1996 
they acquired Red Lion hotels, expanding the company’s portfolio of upscale, full-service hotels 
by 56,000 rooms. They also acquired RFS Inc., a hotel management company and purchased an 
interest in the RFS REIT. Doubletree had also reached a preliminary agreement to buy 
Renaissance, but Marriott outbid them. Then, in September 1997, Promus and Doubletree 
announced their intentions to merge. The two companies consolidated assets under the Promus 
Hotel Corporation name with a total value of $4.7 billion and annual revenues over $5 billion. 
The hotel portfolio consisted of 1,199 properties and a total of 178,800 rooms under multiple 
brands (Embassy Suites, Hampton Inn, Hampton Inn & Suites, Homewood Suites, Doubletree, 
Doubletree Guest Suites and Red Lion). On September 7,1999, Hilton announced their 
intentions to acquire Promus for about $4 billion. This merger resulted in one of the world’s 
largest and most diverse lodging companies, with about 1,900 hotels and 350,000 rooms 
worldwide.
IV. Methodology and Results
In order to test the market’s reaction to merger announcements in the lodging industry, we 
examined the unexpected return the day before through the day after the merger announcement. 
Daily closing prices of the stock for each company were obtained from the CRSP Daily File.
The sample period, for each company, is defined as 102 days before the announcement date 
through one day after the announcement date. The daily returns were computed as the log price 
relatives adjusted for dividends.
The analysis of the effect of corporate acquisitions on stockholder returns is accomplished 
by testing the statistical significance of the unexpected return of a portfolio of acquiring/target 
firms that announced mergers in the lodging industry using the event study methodology. The 
unexpected returns for the portfolios of acquiring and target firms are computed each day of the 
event period. The mean model is used to estimate the expected return during the estimation 
period. The event period is defined as one day before through one day after the announcement 
date. The estimation period consists of 100 trading days prior to the event period.
A brief description of the standard event study methodology used to compute the excess 
returns and t-statistics for the portfolio of acquiring and target firms during the announcement 
period follows. First, the expected return was computed during the estimation period by event z, 
by company j
*
Where:
t is the f  th day relative to a given announcement date i for firm j ,
Rjit is the log price relative for firm j , event i and day t,
N„ is the number of trading days in the estimation period for event z, company j .
The unexpected or excess return is calculated for each day, t, in the event period, by event, z, 
by company j . It is defined as the actual daily return minus the expected return.
8 See Brown and Warner [1980, 1985] for a detailed explanation of event study methodology.
®jit = Rji, -Rji
Where t denotes the fth  day relative to a given announcement date i for firm j . The excess 
returns are averaged across events for the acquiring and target companies separately in order to 
compute the unexpected return for the acquiring/target portfolio of firms for each day, t, in the 
event period.9
j  h
XXs*
5,= ^ —
Xij
j=l
Where lj represents the number of announcements of mergers for company j .
In order to test the statistical significance of the daily excess returns by event and the daily 
excess returns for the acquiring/target portfolio, t statistics were calculated, in the following 
manner: 1) Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return, by event day, t, by announcement, 
z, by company, j:
Where se,, is the standard error of the unexpected returns calculated over the 100-day 
estimation period prior to the event period of each announcement z, by company, j . And, 2) 
Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return on each portfolio, by event day, t:
XX‘&.)
The results, the excess return and the t-statistic for the portfolio of acquiring firms and target 
firms for each day in the event period are presented in Table 2. Panel A presents the results for
the entire sample of both mergers and tender offers, Panel B, the results for the sample of 
mergers alone and Panel C, the results for the sample of tender offers alone. For the sake of 
completeness, the analysis was performed separately for the samples of mergers and tender 
offers since prior research found that acquirers under perform over the long run after mergers, 
but not after tender offers.
9 All statistics are computed assuming independence.
Table 2. Acquirer and Target Portfolio’s Abnormal Returns
Panel A: Mergers and Tender Offers
Day Relative to 
Announcement 
Day
Acquirer Target
Abnormal Return t-statistic Abnormal
Return
t-statistic
-1 0.0547 0.1826 0.6599 0.3358
0 1.2820 3.1460 8.9089 26.4655
+1 -0.2328 -1.4283 1.3406 2.2975
Panel B: Mergers
Acquirer Target
Abnormal Return t-statistic Abnormal t-statistic
Day Relative to 
Announcement
Return
Day
-1 -0.2325 0.1725 1.8153 1.9150
0 0.9056 2.5559 5.5806 17.8217
+1 -0.3254 -1.5722 0.7201 1.8376
Panel C: Tender Offers
Acquirer Target
Abnormal Return t-statistic Abnormal t-statistic
Day Relative to 
Announcement
Return
Day
-1 0.4950 0.1813 -3.2850 -2.2885
0 3.6140 3.5108 14.1200 25.1292
+1 -0.1420 -0.5471 3.7050 1.0758
3. Entire sample —mergers and tender offers together
For the entire data sample, that is for both mergers and tender offers, Table 2, Panel A 
shows the unexpected return and t-statistic for each day during the announcement period, the 
day preceding through the day following the announcement for the portfolio of acquiring firms 
and the portfolio of target firms. The results show that the unexpected return for the portfolio of 
target firms is significantly different from zero on the announcement day, day 0, and the 
following day, day 1. On the announcement day the unexpected return is 8.9089% and the 
unexpected return is 1.3406 % for the following day. Each is significant at the one percent level 
of significance. The extremely large abnormal returns make it quite clear that the shareholders 
of the target firm benefit upon the announcement of the merger.
For the acquiring firm portfolio, the unexpected return is much lower and is significantly 
different from zero only on the announcement day. The unexpected return on the 
announcement day is 1.2820% for the acquiring portfolio compared to an unexpected return of 
8.9089% for the target portfolio on the announcement day. The unexpected return is 
insignificantly different from zero for both the days preceding and following the announcement 
for the portfolio of acquiring firms.
In sum, the results show that the shareholders of both the acquiring and target firms gain at 
the time of the merger announcement. Further, we see that the gains to the shareholders of the 
target firms are much greater than the gains to acquiring shareholders.
These results are consistent with the positive impact hypotheses described in Section III that 
predict that the announcement of an acquisition reflects positive information about the firms 
involved. This positive information results in a positive stock price response. That is, a 
statistically significant and positive unexpected return. The positive price response may be due 
to the effects of monopolistic market power, increased productive efficiency due to synergies 
and/or increased efficiency due to the removal of inefficiencies. Each of these effects predicts 
that the combined firm generates cash flows with a present value in excess of the sum of the 
market values of the acquiring and target firms.
The results found here are similar to those for the overall market for the portfolio of target 
firms but are different for the acquiring firm portfolio. For the overall market, most studies that 
examine mergers’ effect on shareholders agree that target-firm shareholders gain when the 
merger is announced. Our results are consistent with the overall empirical evidence for the
target firms. However, the existing evidence regarding the gains to acquiring shareholders are 
mixed. Some studies show that merger bids are, on average, negative net present value 
investments for bidders. However, others report slightly positive, but statistically insignificant, 
abnormal returns -  suggesting that merger bids are zero net present value investments. Our 
evidence differs significantly since we find significantly positive unexpected returns for the 
portfolio of bidding firms on the merger announcement day. Unlike the results for the overall 
market, we find that both the stockholders of the acquiring and target firms gain at the time of 
the merger announcement. It appears that in the lodging industry, mergers are positive net 
present value investments for bidders. As a result, mergers, on average in the lodging industry 
have been value-maximizing decisions.
In sum, the results suggest that mergers appear to be value enhancing in the lodging industry 
since both the target and acquiring portfolios earn positive excess returns. On average, mergers 
increase the value to the shareholders of the target firms while not reducing the value, actually 
increasing the value, to the shareholders of the acquiring firms.
The results may differ in the lodging industry relative to the overall market since most of the 
mergers in the lodging industry have remained within the company’s core business. It makes 
sense that mergers are more likely to succeed when companies buy businesses they know 
something about. In addition, most of the mergers in the industry have occurred more recently. 
Over this period, senior managers have become substantial shareholders, ensuring that their 
interests are more closely aligned with those of other owners of the business. This may have 
discouraged more egotistical deals.
4. Mergers and tender offers, separately
The empirical evidence for the overall market indicates that the effect of takeover attempts 
varies across takeover techniques. Both acquiring and target firms experience higher abnormal 
returns in tender offers relative to mergers. The mode of acquisition may be related to the 
expected wealth gains resulting from operating synergies and the disciplining of target 
managers. Mergers are usually friendly deals that enjoy the cooperation of incumbent 
managers. Tender offers are made directly to target shareholders, often to overcome resistance 
from incumbent managers, and indicate greater confidence in the acquirer’s ability to realize
efficiency gains from the acquisition. Martin and McConnell (1991) document a large turnover 
of target managers during the two years following tender offers, which suggests that the 
acquirers in tender offers attempt to create wealth gains by removing inefficient managers.
As shown in Table 2, Panels B and C, our results are consistent. Target firms experience 
statistically significant abnormal stock price changes of 25.12% in tender offers and 5.5806% in 
mergers on the announcement day. Acquiring firms experience statistically significant 
abnormal returns of 3.6140% and 0.9056% in tender offers and mergers, respectively. Our 
results indicate that the wealth gains to tender offers are significantly greater than the wealth 
gains to mergers, in the lodging industry. Whether or not this difference is due to the acquirers 
ability to achieve larger efficiency gains in tender offers than in mergers is an interesting topic 
for frirther research.
5. Short-, medium- and long-term performance
We know that for the overall market, less than half of all mergers add value in the medium- 
to long-term. In order to analyze this result for lodging companies, we compared the short-, 
medium- and long-term performance of lodging companies involved in consolidation to the 
overall market. More specifically, we examined the short-, medium- and long-term average 
market value of equity for our sample of lodging companies involved in consolidation. In 
addition, we examined the short-, medium- and long-term average market value of equity for all 
publicly traded companies. In this way we are controlling for the differences in overall market 
conditions, across time. The results are presented in Table 3. The average market value of 
equity for lodging companies is greater after the merger relative to one week before the merger 
over each holding period. The average market value of equity is $0,948 million one week 
before the merger announcements. Whereas, the average market value of equity is $2,312 
million, one year after, $2,171 million, two years after, $2,006 million, three years after, $1,748 
million, four years after, and $1,289 million, five years after. The average value reaches a peak, 
one year and falls steadily throughout the five-year period. However, even at the end of the fifth 
year, the average market value is higher than the pre-merger value.
It could be that these results are due to market-wide factors independent of value added as a 
result of the mergers. As shown, in Table 3, the average overall market value follows exactly 
the same pattern. It peaks one year after and falls steadily throughout the five-year period.
However, unlike the lodging sample, the average overall market value two years after, of 
$5,818, million falls below the initial value of $6,359 million.
As shown in Table 3, Panel B, the average holding period returns of lodging companies 
involved in mergers have been large and positive for periods up to five years. The one-year 
holding period return was 143.82 percent, the two year, 128.85%, the three year, 111.54%, the 
four year, 84.27%, and the five year 35.90%. The holding period return was highest over the 
one-year period and decreases as the holding period increases. On the other hand, the holding 
period return for the overall market has been positive only for the one year holding period. The 
one-year holding period return was 8.99%, the two year, -8.51%, the three year, -15.21%, the 
four year, -17.24%, and the five year, -19.03%. The holding period return has been decreasing 
as the length of the holding period increases. These results clearly show that mergers have 
created value in the lodging industry in the short- medium- and long- terms. The large positive 
returns are a result of the mergers, not a result of market wide fluctuations.
Table 3.
Pre-merger and Post-merger Market Value of Equity and 
Returns for Lodging Companies and the Entire Market
Panel A
Average Market Value of Equity
Time Relative to 
Announcement 
($ millions)
Overall Market 
($ millions)
Merged Lodging 
Companies 
($ millions)
1 week before 6,358.944 0.948
1 year after 6,930.925 2.312
2 years after 5,817.924 2.171
3 years after 5,391.721 2.006
4 years after 5,262.755 1.748
5 years after 5,148.857 1.289
Panel B
Average Holding Period Returns
Holding Period Entire Market
Merged Lodging 
Companies
1 year 0.0899 1.4382
2 years -0.0851 1.2885
3 years -0.1521 1.1154
4 years -0.1724 0.8427
5 years -0.1903 0.3590
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the stock market reacts favorably to merger announcements in the 
lodging industry for both the acquiring and the target firms. In addition, the reaction is significantly 
stronger for tender offers than for mergers. These results differ from those for the overall market, which 
indicate that in general, the target stockholders benefit from mergers while the bidders generally break 
even. In addition, we have provided evidence that for lodging companies the combined equity value of 
the bidding and target firms increase as a result of takeovers in the short-, medium and long-term. These 
increases in equity values could be attributed to some unmeasured source of real economic gains, such as 
operating synergies, tax savings, transfers from employees or other stakeholders, or increased monopoly 
rents. But, the equity value gains could also be due to capital market inefficiencies, arising simply from 
the creation of an overvalued security. From the stock price perspective, the anticipation of real 
economic gains is observationally equivalent to market mispricing. How ever, an analysis of pre and 
post merger accounting data will allow us to test directly for changes in operating performance that result 
from mergers. This is the topic of research currently in progress. If the stock market’s positive reaction 
and increased valuation represent actual economic gains, then these firms should exhibit post-merger 
increases in operating cash flows returns relative to pre-merger values and/or decreases in their overall 
cost of capital. These economic gains may come as a result of economies of scale or scope economics. 
Economies of scale are the reductions in per-unit costs that come as the size of a company’s operations 
increase, in terms of revenues or unit production. Economies of scope occur when a business can offer a 
broader range of services to its customer base resulting in an increase in operating revenue. The increase 
in operating revenues may be due to an improvement in market share, product mix and strategic benefits 
such as access to new and/or difficult to enter markets. Cost reductions may be due to economies of 
scale reached after achieving a critical mass, complementary resources and inefficiency elimination. The 
post-merger increase in operating cash flow would explain a pre-merger (at the time of announcement) 
stock price reaction as a result of anticipated economic gains, indicating that the expected economic 
improvements underlie the equity reevaluations of the merging firms.
By examining the abnormal returns alone, it is impossible to identify which components of the 
present value of net cash flows have changed. Without more detailed information about each merger, it 
is impossible to distinguish among the three effects. For example, data on the equity price changes of 
firms that compete in product markets with the merged target would allow us to test the hypothesis that
takeovers create market power. The market power hypothesis implies that mergers increase product 
prices thereby benefiting the merging firms and other competing firms in the industry. Higher prices 
allow competing firms to increase their own product prices and therefore the equity values of competing 
firms should also rise on the offer announcement.
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Date
Announced
Date
Effective Year Acquirer Target
Value of 
Transaction Type
Tender
Offer Form
11/20/1981 3/3/1982 1982 Marriott Corp Host International inc $152.4 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1982 Totals 1 $152.4
4/22/1983
1/31/1983
4/22/1983
4/6/1983
1983
1983
Bally Manufacturing Corp 
Bally Manufacturing Corp
Bally's Park Place Inc 
Federated Income and Private
$286.3
$137.4
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value
No
No
Acq. Maj. Int. 
Merger
1983 Totals 2 $423.7
8/1/1984
7/5/1984
9/18/1984
7/5/1984
1984
1984
Prime Motor Inns Inc 
Golden Nugget Inc
American Motor Inns Inc 
MCA Inc
$216.0
$100.0
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases
Yes
No
Merger 
Acq. Part. Int.
1984 Totals 2 $316.0
12/21/1984
8/16/1985
11/25/1985
5/31/1985
9/26/1985
12/30/1985
1985
1985
1985
Pratt Hotel Corp 
Resorts International Inc 
Southmark Corp
Drew National Corp 
Pan Am Corp 
Servico Inc
$308.6
$97.3
$54.4
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases 
Stake Purchases
No
No
No
Merger 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int.
1985 Totals 3 $460.3
11/15/1985
5/7/1986
4/25/1986
8/4/1986
1986
1986
Bally Manufacturing Corp 
Marriott Corp
MGM Grand Hotels Inc 
Saga Corp
$564.5
$500.5
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value
Yes
Yes
Merger
Merger
1986 Totals 2 $1,065.0
4/26/1988
12/16/1988
2/29/1988
11/2/1987
4/26/1988
12/14/1988
2/29/1988
3/1/1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
Bally Manufacturing Corp 
Golden Nugget Inc 
National Realty LP 
Southmark Corp
US Health Inc 
Caesars World Inc 
Servico Inc 
Servico Inc
$28.5
$10.6
$5.8
$5.8
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases 
Stake Purchases 
Disclosed Dollar Value
No
No
No
Yes
Acq. Maj. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Maj. Int.
1988 Totals 4 $50.7
4/15/1988 1/13/1989 1989 Bally Manufacturing Corp US Health Inc $55.5 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1989 Totals 1 $55.5
Date
Announced
Date
Effective Year Acquirer Target
Value of 
Transaction Type
Tender
Offer Form
7/19/1990 12/27/1990 1990 Caesars World Inc Caesars New Jersey Inc $48.4 Disclosed Dollar Value Yes Acq. Rem. Int.
1990 Totals 1 $48.4
6/3/1992 7/1/1992 1992 Microtel Franchise and Dvlp Hudson Hotels Corp $4.8 Disclosed Dollar Value No Acq. of Assets
1992 Totals 1 $4.8
2/18/1993
4/7/1993
10/1/1993
4/30/1993
1993
1993
Sahara Resorts
Blockbuster Entertainment Corp
Sahara Casino Partners LP 
Discovery Zone Inc
$19.4
$10.3
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases
No
No
Acq. Rem. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int.
1993 Totals 2 $29.7
4/7/1993
3/14/1994
10/18/1993
6/23/1994
12/2/1993
9/6/1994
8/9/1994
1/24/1994
6/23/1994
2/18/1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
Blockbuster Entertainment Corp 
Sea Containers Ltd 
La Quinta Inns Inc 
Sodexho SA(Financiere Sodexho) 
HFS Inc
Discovery Zone Inc 
Orient-Express Hotels Inc 
La Quinta Motor Inns LP 
Corrections Corp of America 
Capital Gaming International
$136.0
$75.2
$46.4
$17.5
$5.0
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases 
Stake Purchases
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Acq. Maj. Int. 
Merger 
Merger 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int.
1994 Totals 5 $280.1
7/6/1995
11/2/1994
12/1/1995
12/19/1995
1/26/1995
11/30/1995
5/11/1995
12/6/1995
12/19/1995
1/26/1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
Grand Casinos Inc 
HFS Inc 
HFS Inc
Grand Casinos Inc 
Sky Scientific Inc
Gaming Corp of America 
Casino & Credit Services Inc 
Insignia Financial Group 
Stratosphere Corp 
Jockey Club Inc
$139.2
$33.3
$13.9
$7.5
$2.5
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases 
Stake Purchases 
Disclosed Dollar Value
No
No
No
No
No
Merger 
Merger 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Part. Int. 
Acq. Maj. Int.
1995 Totals 5 $196.4
6/6/1996
8/28/1996
2/16/1996
3/15/1996
12/18/1996
11/8/1996
6/13/1996
9/16/1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
Hilton Hotels Corp 
Doubletree Corp 
Marriott International Inc 
Promus Hotel Corp
Bally Entertainment Corp 
Red Lions Hotels(Red Lion Inn) 
Forum Group Inc 
Winston Hotels Inc
$3,138.1
$1,174.1
$622.3
$1.5
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Disclosed Dollar Value 
Stake Purchases
No
No
Yes
No
Merger 
Merger 
Merger 
Acq. Part. Int.
1996 Totals 4 $4,936.0
Date Date Value of Tender
Announced Effective Year Acquirer Target Transaction Type Offer Form
5/27/1997 12/18/1997 1997 CUC International Inc HFS Inc $11,342.9 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
11/11/1996 4/30/1997 1997 HFS Inc PHH Corp $1,809.5 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
9/2/1997 12/19/1997 1997 Promus Hotel Corp Doubletree Corp $1,703.6 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1/17/1997 4/11/1997 1997 Extended Stay America Inc Studio Plus Hotels Inc $295.9 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
3/20/1996 7/1/1997 1997 Hollywood Park Inc Boomtown Inc $183.5 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
7/25/1997 12/1/1997 1997 Prime Hospitality Corp Homegate Hospitality Inc $133.2 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
5/6/1997 7/25/1997 1997 Riddell Sports Inc Varsity Spirit $91.0 Disclosed Dollar Value Yes Merger
1997 Totals 7 $15,559.6
10/20/1997 2/24/1998 1998 Starwood Hotels & Resorts ITT Corp $13,748.2 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1/5/1998 7/17/1998 1998 Meditrust Acquisition Co La Quinta Inns Inc $2,907.5 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
12/2/1997 6/2/1998 1998 Patriot Amer Hosp/Wyndham Inti Interstate Hotels Co $2,055.9 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
3/23/1998 7/28/1998 1998 Felcor Lodging Trust Inc Bristol Hotel Co $1,793.2 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
3/16/1998 8/3/1998 1998 CapStar Hotel Co American General Hospitality $1,211.8 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
12/19/1997 1/20/1998 1998 Harrah's Entertainment Inc Showboat Inc $1,147.6 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
6/29/1998 12/31/1998 1998 Hilton Hotels Corp Grand Casinos Inc $832.4 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
4/14/1997 1/5/1998 1998 Patriot Amer Hosp/Wyndham Inti Wyndham Hotel Corp $773.1 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
12/31/1997 5/22/1998 1998 Boykin Lodging Co Red Lion Inns LP $276.0 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
9/12/1997 1/16/1998 1998 Patriot Amer Hosp/Wyndham Inti WHG Resorts & Casino Inc $266.0 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
9/2/1998 9/2/1998 1998 MeriStar Hospitality Corp Meristar Hotels & Resorts Inc $1.4 Stake Purchases No Acq. Part. Int.
1998 Totals 11 $25,013.1
9/7/1999 12/1/1999 1999 Hilton Hotels Corp Promus Hotel Corp $3,642.7 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
8/10/1998 1/4/1999 1999 Harrah's Entertainment Inc Rio Hotel & Casino Inc $821.9 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
11/9/1998 3/1/1999 1999 MGM Grand lnc(Tracinda Corp) Primadonna Resorts Inc $268.4 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
6/11/1999 10/26/1999 1999 Humphrey Hospitality Supertel Hospitality Inc $52.8 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1/28/1999 5/10/1999 1999 Jameson Inns Inc Signature Inns Inc $41.2 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
1999 Totals 5 $4,827.0
8/16/1999 3/22/2000 2000 Harrah's Entertainment Inc Players International Inc $428.3 Disclosed Dollar Value No Merger
2000 Totals 1 $428.3
